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Research on entrepreneurship often examines the local dimensions of new business formation.  The
local environment influences the choices of entrepreneurs; entrepreneurial success influences the local
economy.  Yet modern urban economics has paid relatively little attention to entrepreneurs.  This essay
introduces a special issue of Journal of Urban Economics dedicated to the geography of entrepreneurship.
The paper frames the core questions facing researchers interested in assessing the local causes and
consequences of entrepreneurship, perturbs a core urban model to incorporate entrepreneurship, and
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Can the economic history of Detroit be told without Henry Ford and Alfred 
Sloan?  Would Ford have achieved the same success if he had worked in Houston?   
Would Silicon Valley have experienced its remarkable growth without Frederick Terman 
and William Shockley?   Entrepreneurs often seem to have been significantly influenced 
by features of their local economies, and they have often influenced the fates of those 
economies.  Yet, urban economists have only infrequently looked directly at the local 
causes and consequences of entrepreneurship.     
Urban economists have not been alone in paying little attention to entrepreneurs.  
This is a common feature of economic research after World War II.   The general 
equilibrium models that came to dominate economics had little room for the 
idiosyncrasies of the individuals who started firms.   The primary role that Schumpeter 
(1934) had assigned to entrepreneurs was largely ignored by mainstream economic 
theory.  Empirical economists focused more on aggregates and on patterns that held 
throughout the economy.  But over the past decade, entrepreneurship has become an 
increasingly established field that has tried to understand business innovators.  This 
special issue of the Journal of Urban Economics brings together papers that specifically 
focus on the local dimensions of entrepreneurship.   
While there has been relatively little formal work on cities and entrepreneurship, 
the papers in this volume do not come out of a vacuum.   Some urban economists, 
notably Vernon and Chinitz, wrote directly about entrepreneurship (i.e., Vernon, 1960; 
Chinitz, 1961).  Moreover, urbanists from outside of economics, like Jacobs (1969) and 
Saxenian (1994), have had important insights about the local roots of entrepreneurship.  
In addition, some of the canonical work in urban economics can be interpreted as having 
an entrepreneurial dimension.  For example, in this paper, we will discuss the 
entrepreneurial aspects of urban economic research on agglomeration in general and on 
New Economic Geography (NEG) in particular.
1   
                                                 
1 Research in agglomeration is surveyed by Duranton and Puga (2004), Rosenthal and Strange (2004), 
while NEG is surveyed by Fujita et al (1999) and Ottaviano and Thisse (2004).  
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 Section II of this essay reviews the role of entrepreneurship in urban economics.  
Since entrepreneurship has many dimensions, we begin by discussing the definition of 
entrepreneurship.  We then turn to early urbanists, who promoted a number of ideas about 
entrepreneurship that can help systematize research in this area.  Perhaps the most 
important idea is that entrepreneurship is important for urban success.  Smith (1776) and 
Marshall (1920) both seemed to share this view, and it is the central lesson of the work of 
Chinitz and Vernon.   While this idea may now be a consensus opinion, there is still 
surprisingly little statistical work that bears it out.  
The other ideas relate to the reasons that different places spawn different levels of 
entrepreneurship.  It is not at all surprising that economists have linked the level of 
entrepreneurship to the returns to entrepreneurship:  the supply of entrepreneurship slopes 
up.  While this idea has been around since Smith, there has been little work actually 
measuring the response of entrepreneurship to these financial incentives.  One version of 
this idea, properly credited to Smith himself, is that large cities have more demand for 
specialized products which makes them particularly attractive places for start-ups 
creating new products.
2  This naturally moves the equilibrium up the entrepreneurial 
supply curve.    
It is also not surprising that economists have looked for shifters of the 
entrepreneurial supply function.  There are many local characteristics that might be 
responsible for such shifts.  Chinitz, Marshall and others emphasized that the level of 
entrepreneurship is related to the supply of inputs needed by entrepreneurs, including 
material inputs, skilled labor and financing.  Chinitz and Marshall both also emphasized 
the spread of knowledge as forces that could encourage entrepreneurship.  And the list of 
entrepreneurial supply shifters should also include political and cultural forces, as well as 
natural advantage.    
In Section III, we present a brief urban model that incorporates entrepreneurship.  
We work with the production and consumption assumptions of Krugman (1991), a model 
that shares important features with Abdel-Rahman (1988), Fujita (1988), Rivera-Batiz 
(1988).   We share with Rivera-Batiz (1988) the focus on a single small city in a large 
                                                 
2See also Duranton and Puga (2001), Duranton and Jayet (2009), and Waldfogel (2009) for related work. 
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 open economy.   The key formal results in this section document both the impact that 
entrepreneurs on local success and also the local factors that influence entrepreneurship.   
Section IV then uses this framework of the causes and consequences of 
entrepreneurship to categorize the papers in this issue and relate them to other recent 
research on entrepreneurship.  Many of the papers here pay particularly close attention to 
the supply of entrepreneurial people across space.  Fewer touch on the effects of 
entrepreneurship or the link between entrepreneurship and the returns to entrepreneurial 
activity.  Section V concludes and sets out the major questions for future research.  
 
II.  Entrepreneurship in urban economics 
 
What is an entrepreneur?  Webster’s Dictionary (1970, p. 467) defines an 
entrepreneur as, “A person who organizes and manages a business undertaking, assuming 
the risk for the sake of profit.”
3    
There are several distinct economic aspects of entrepreneurship.  One is that that 
entrepreneurs are their own bosses.  In this conception of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs 
are self-employed.   However, this approach misses the proprietary aspect of 
entrepreneurship;  entrepreneurs can also be thought of as owners, willing to assume risk 
in exchange for returns (Cantillon, 1931; Knight, 1921).  At least initially, the firms that 
entrepreneurs create are small, so another dimension of entrepreneurship is its role in 
small business.   But entrepreneurship is not simply about a choice of occupation or about 
ownership, it is also fundamentally dynamic.  Thus, entrepreneurs can also be conceived 
of as being the creators of new firms, and the study of entrepreneurship is the study of 
entry.  In this view, entrepreneurs are agents of change.  That view leads to yet another 
possible conception of entrepreneurs as innovators, agents of transformative change 
(Schumpeter, 1939), and not simply entrants in a market that is fundamentally the same 
year after year.    There are, thus, five facets of entrepreneurship:  self-employment, small 
firms, ownership, entry, and innovation.
4  
                                                 
3 Classical economists often used the word “undertaker” to mean essentially the same thing.  The 
alternative meaning of that word has caused it to disappear from use in the twentieth century.   
4 All of these aspects of entrepreneurship involve the entrepreneur exercising judgment, a point made by 
Casson (1982). 
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 Since all of these facets of entrepreneurship are important, it would be a mistake 
to take the overly narrow view that an entrepreneur must have all of the five 
characteristics listed above.   Examining the various aspects of entrepreneurship is 
logically sensible, and the overly narrow definition excludes important activities.  In the 
non-profit sector, for instance, entrepreneurs often cede ownership over the enterprise to 
an external board.  In the for profit sector, shares are typically sold to outsiders, which, in 
principle, could lead to a separation of ownership and control.   Entrepreneurs can also in 
some cases work for someone else.  For example, Michael Porter is both an employee of 
Harvard University and a management consulting entrepreneur, as well as being a scholar 
of entrepreneurship. 
Measuring these aspects of entrepreneurship is often difficult.  In a sense, every 
self-employed person is something of an entrepreneur, but using the self-employment rate 
to capture the level of entrepreneurship does no weighting for the size of enterprises, or 
the level of risk and innovation.   After all, many of the self-employed own nothing but 
their own human capital.    Measuring entrepreneurship instead with the number of newly 
established firms does better at capturing size.  At least initially, the firms that 
entrepreneurs create are small, so in some cases, entrepreneurship is empirically linked to 
an abundance of small firms.   However, some conceptions of entrepreneurs conceive of 
the entrepreneur as being more than just another business owner.  In this view, true 
entrepreneurs do more than just open another hot dog stand, they actually do something 
new.  All of this means that it is difficult for the researcher to capture all of the 
potentially relevant aspects of entrepreneurship.    
The history of the Journal of Urban Economics allows us to look quantitatively at 
the history of the entrepreneurship research in urban economics.  An electronic search 
brings up the word “entrepreneur” in 57 distinct articles in the Journal of Urban 
Economics.  21 of these articles were prior to 1990.  In many cases, the word 
entrepreneur occurs only once, often in the citation list.   The pre-1990 articles that 
discuss entrepreneurs at any length generally focus on entrepreneurs who either build 
housing or create entire cities, as in Henderson (1985).  In the 1970s and 1980s, Journal 
of Urban Economics published only two articles that focused primarily on private sector, 
non-housing related entrepreneurship (Bates, 1978, Sveikauskas, 1979).   The situation is 
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 similar at Regional Science and Urban Economics, with 67 papers mentioning 
entrepreneurs, 15 before 1990.
5 
The lack of attention to entrepreneurs is not merely a reflection of editorial 
decisions of these two major urban field journals.   The pioneering urban economists of 
the 1960s, such as William Alonso, Richard Muth, Edwin Mills, and John Kain, rarely 
addressed entrepreneurship outside of the housing sector.
6    The absence of 
entrepreneurs in urban economic papers before 1990 reflects both forces that operated 
throughout economics and factors specific to the field.  Urban economics arose as a field 
in part in response to the raging debates about American urban policy that took place in 
the 1960s and 1970s.  The field, therefore, tended to focus on problems of housing 
markets and urban public policy and not so much on entrepreneurship.       
Moreover, the focus of many urban economists has been on creating formal 
economic models of cities, following either in the linear programming tradition of 
Beckman and Koopmans (1958) or the more continuous tradition of mainstream general 
equilibrium models.  In these models, entrepreneurs may be embedded in firms, but in the 
embedding, much of what was interesting about entrepreneurship disappeared.  The 
lumpy, random nature of entrepreneurship fit poorly into an agenda aimed at creating 
tractable models.  Instead, assuming free entry of firms enabled modelers to work with 
the powerful zero profit condition that could deliver powerful results.   The mathematical 
advantages of non-entrepreneurial economics were not unique to the urban field: 
entrepreneurs are rarely encountered in models elsewhere in economics.
7   
For this reason, some of the most important early insights on entrepreneurship in 
cities were written by urban economists who used prose rather than algebra.  Perhaps the 
most important set of insights were generated by the New York Metropolitan Region 
Project of the 1950s that brought together, among others, Hoover, Vernon and Chinitz.   
These authors’ work (i.e., Hoover and Vernon, 1962;  Vernon, 1960; Chinitz, 1961) was 
stylistically closer to modern business history, which has consistently focused on 
entrepreneurship and place (e.g. Saxenian, 1994), than to formal urban economics.   The 
                                                 
5 The Science Direct files on the Journal of Urban Economics go back to 1974 and the journal’s founding; 
the files on Regional Science and Urban Economics begin in 1975 with Volume 5 of that journal.   
6 In this statement, we distinguish between Mills’ research published in journals and his textbook, Mills and 
Hamilton (1997).  The latter does address entrepreneurship outside of the housing sector.    
7 See Baumol (1968) for a discussion of this issue.  A prominent exception is Lucas (1978).   
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 incorporation of entrepreneurship into urban economics really started in the 1970s, with 
the work of Sveikauskas and Henderson, who produced a long string of articles that relate 
to entrepreneurship.  Over the past 20 years, entrepreneurs have steadily become more 
important in urban economics, as urban economists have increased their focus on city 
economies, developed relevant models, and gotten access to data sets that are relevant to 
empirical research on entrepreneurship and innovation.     
Yet despite the scarcity of papers with formal algebra or econometrics, the big 
ideas about entrepreneurship were sketched long before the current surge in 
entrepreneurial research.  Perhaps the single most important idea that comes out of the 
focus on entrepreneurship in cities is the claim that entrepreneurs play a critical role in 
making cities economically dynamic.  For example, in Smith’s (1776) discussion of the 
rise of cities, dynamic burghers play a leading role.   He describes the introduction of 
“those manufactures which are fit for distant sale,” which can be interpreted as 
technologically advanced goods and credits.  He also discusses the benefits of “the 
violent operation, if one may say so, of the stocks of particular merchants and 
undertakers.”  Marshall (1920) tied urban growth and entrepreneurship even more tightly, 
writing that “localization and the growth of the system of capitalist undertakers were two 
parallel movements, due to the same general cause, and each of them promoting the 
advance of the other.”  Localization enabled the creation of large quantities of 
specialized, tradable products, but that production required “capitalist undertakers,”  also 
known as entrepreneurs.   
The work that grew out of the New York Metropolitan Region Project also 
emphasized the importance of entrepreneurship for the success of New York.  Chinitz 
(1961) compared New York and Pittsburgh, and argued that New York’s greater success 
was linked to a more abundant “supply schedule of entrepreneurship.”   Likewise, 
Hoover and Vernon (1962) depict New York City as an incubator of new business 
activity, and connects the continuing strength of that city to its constant flow of new 
businesses.   Later business scholars such as Porter (1990) and Saxenian (1994) would 
echo this message that local success depends on innovative entrepreneurs.    
More recently, the connection between entrepreneurship and urban success has 
been embraced by a number of urban economists.  For example, Duranton and Puga 
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 (2001) use the term “nursery cities” to describe places that specialize in creating new 
firms and succeed through this innovation.  In a related vein, Helsley and Strange (2009) 
adapt Lazear's (2005) model of balanced skills to establish that size is not everything.  In 
order to cultivate entrepreneurship, the entrepreneur's skills and the city's resources must 
be in a sense complementary.  Another theoretical approach to entrepreneurship is taken 
by Forslid and Ottaviano (2002), who add "footloose" entrepreneurs to a New Economic 
Geography model.  These agents are in fixed supply, and their human capital is required 
to form firms.  The focus here is not on entrepreneurs per se, but instead on how 
including this sort of mobile and scarce human capital in the NEG model can improve 
tractability.  On the empirical side, Glaeser et al. (1992) documents the connection 
between small firms and urban success, and interpret these results as reflecting the 
benefits of competition and entrepreneurship.  Miracky (1992), Rosenthal and Strange 
(2003, 2009) and  Glaeser and Kerr (2009) provide similar research along these lines.  
While it would be hard to imagine a world in which an abundance of entrepreneurs did 
not strengthen the local economy, the literature documenting this effect is still in its 
infancy.   
Establishing a causal connection between entrepreneurship and local success is 
difficult because entrepreneurship, in contrast to the proximity to coal or a good harbor, is 
unlikely to an exogenous local variable determined by nature.  Those urban economists 
who have focused on entrepreneurship, Chinitz and Vernon and Hoover, have seen 
entrepreneurship as the reflection of other, deeper forces.  Broadly, urban economists 
have offered several hypotheses about why entrepreneurship differs across space: (1) 
differential returns to entrepreneurship (movement along an entrepreneurial supply 
curve), (2) differential availability of inputs to entrepreneurship, including 
entrepreneurial human capital and (3) differential supplies of ideas; and (4) differences in 
the local culture, political system, or endowments.  The first hypothesis refers to a 
movement along an entrepreneurial supply curve.  Hypotheses (2)-(4) refer to a shift in 
an entrepreneurial supply curve.  It is worth remarking that this list is parallel to the well-
known list of explanations for the agglomeration of economic activity, a parallel to which 
we will return later. 
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 Regarding the movement along an entrepreneurial supply curve, hypothesis (1) 
above,  Smith’s famous dictum that the “division of labor is limited by the extent of the 
market,” suggested that certain entrepreneurial activities could only make financial sense 
in large communities or places that had ready access to transportation.   Smith’s 
description foreshadows the modern description of agglomeration economies, where a 
larger home market can increase the returns to introducing new products, as in Krugman 
(1991).  Chinitz, as well, argued that New York’s scale had some role in its 
entrepreneurial nature, although he argued that scale alone was not enough to distinguish 
Gotham from Pittsburgh. 
Nearly fifty years ago, Chinitz (1961) argued that economists ignored 
entrepreneurship because “the implicit assumption, I suppose, is that the supply schedule 
of entrepreneurship is identical at all locations.”  The rest of the ideas in the list relate to 
factors that would generate different supply curves for entrepreneurship across locations.  
The second theory of local entrepreneurship emphasizes the importance of inputs into 
entrepreneurship: some places have more venture capital or the right type of labor or 
independent input suppliers.    For example, if the bulk of the firms in a region are 
vertically integrated then a lack of independent suppliers may make it difficult for a new 
firm to sprout.   In some industries, skilled labor is vital and as a result a virtuous circle 
can occur where entrepreneurs come to a place because of the workers and the workers 
come to the place because of the entrepreneurs.    Idiosyncrasies in firm outcome may 
enhance the gains for entrepreneurs to locate in large cities, since statistical returns to 
scale essentially help protect workers and lenders (Helsley and Strange, 1990).  Workers 
may be more willing to take on the risks of working for an entrepreneurial start-up in a 
large city with plenty of alternative employers.  
The third hypothesis is that places may differ in the generation and transmission 
of entrepreneurial ideas.  Marshall (1920) emphasized the role of ideas in infrastructure 
and argued that the flow of ideas from person to person was an external economy that 
enhanced innovation in cities: “if one man starts a new idea, it is taken up by others and 
combined with suggestions of their own; and thus it becomes the source of further new 
ideas.”  He described an entrepreneurial chain where “subsidiary trades grow up in the 
neighborhood, supplying it with implements and materials, organizing its traffic, and in 
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 many ways conducing to the economy of its material.”  One implication of Marshall’s 
logic is that entrepreneurs will congregate next to one another to learn from each other.  
Another implication is that we should expect to see chains of innovation where one big 
idea is followed with many others.    
Jacobs (1969) is strongly associated with the view that new ideas are the well-
spring of entrepreneurship and new businesses make cities grow.  Like Chinitz, she 
admired small firms, which she saw as being conducive to innovation, and density, which 
helps to speed the flow of ideas.  She also emphasized industrial diversity, arguing that 
some of the biggest innovations are the product of cross-industry fertilization.   A modern 
example of this phenomenon is Michael Bloomberg, who used his financial expertise 
gained at Salomon Brothers to create an information technology firm that could cater to 
traders. 
It is important to recognize that the inputs, skills, and ideas explanations for the 
variation in entrepreneurship can arise endogenously.  Regarding skills, Chinitz 
suggested that the children of corporate managers might be less likely to become 
entrepreneurs than the children of small business owners.  In this way, historical 
industrial specialization in small firm industries, like the garment trade, might lead to an 
ongoing abundance of entrepreneurs, who then encourage their own spinoffs.  Similar 
stories of positive feedback can be told of inputs and of ideas. 
The fourth explanation is that local differences in political system, culture, or in 
other local endowments have the potential to impact entrepreneurship.   Smith notes that, 
“Order and good government, and along with them the liberty and security of individuals, 
were ...established in cities at a time when the occupiers of land in the country were 
exposed to every sort of violence.”  He argues that this security of property led city 
residents to take on more business risks.  Saxenian (1994) has emphasized local 
difference in culture.  Silicon Valley investors, for instance, did not blackball 
entrepreneurs who had failed previously, a forgiving attitude that is credited with the 
Valley's entrepreneurial culture.   Finally, natural advantage may impact 
entrepreneurship.   Pittsburgh’s coal mines made it a center for steel which is inherently 
less entrepreneurial while New York’s port gave it access to the world and attracted an 
abundance of entrepreneurs 
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 As noted above, explanations for differences in entrepreneurial activity parallel 
common explanations for agglomeration.  This parallel leads naturally to the conclusion 
that entrepreneurship can be part of a virtuous circle, where entrepreneurial activity leads 
to the circumstances that foster further activity.  Of course, the flip side of this conclusion 
is that the absence of entrepreneurship can lead to a vicious circle.  This strongly suggests 
that an improved understanding of entrepreneurship has the potential to help in the 
understanding of poverty and urban decline.   
 
II.  Entrepreneurship in an urban model 
 
This section will present a simple NEG model that incorporates entrepreneurs.  
The model builds on Abdel-Rahman (1988), Fujita (1988), Rivera-Batiz (1988), and 
Krugman (1991).   None of these paper contains the word entrepreneur, but the NEG 
analysis that they offer can be extended in a way that captures the connection between 
entrepreneurship and local success and some of the causes of entrepreneurship. 
This extension is meant to accomplish three things.  First, the analysis will help us 
to better understand the equilibrium forces that can explain the spatial variation of 
entrepreneurial activity and the impact of entrepreneurship on the larger economy.  
Second, the analysis will provide context for the rest of the papers in this issue.  Third, by 
showing how entrepreneurs can be included in one important urban model, this section 
suggests a program for introducing entrepreneurs into other lines of urban research, 
pointing towards an agenda for future spatial research on entrepreneurs. 
 
Exogenous entrepreneurs        
Following Krugman, individual utility is defined over an aggregate of separate 
manufactured goods, each denoted    and land, denoted L.  Denoting the elasticity of 
substitution among the varieties of manufactured goods by σ and adopting Cobb-Douglas 
utility, we have  
U =     
   
   
  
   
    .   (1)    
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 We will focus on one small city within a large open economy.  The city has a fixed total 
supply of land denoted  .    The renters live in the city and spend their income there.   
The basic technological assumption is that to produce X units of a manufactured 
good, a producer requires        units of labor.   We assume that some manufactured 
good varieties are traded, while others are not.   We suppose that the price of traded 
goods is normalized to  
 
    (which implicitly assumes that the price of  labor external to 
this city is normalized to one).   The price of non-traded goods will be endogenous. 
Krugman critically assumes that there is free entry of firms to the point where 
profits are zero.   This is, implicitly, an assumption about entrepreneurship:  the supply 
schedule of entrepreneurs is everywhere the same, and indeed everywhere horizontal.  
This assumption essentially takes entrepreneurship out of the model.  Instead, we assume 
that there are a fixed number of entrepreneurs, denoted   .  These entrepreneurs produce 
two sorts of goods.  We suppose that a share   of the entrepreneurs produce traded 
goods.  The external demand for each traded good produced in the city is assumed to be 
given by 
      
      
    
  
,     (2) 
where P is the traded good's price.  Let     denote the number of entrepreneurs in the 
non-traded sector.  The local demand for goods is determined endogenously.  These 
assumptions allow us to look at the city in isolation. 
Using this setup, we are able to characterize how entrepreneurship influences 
market outcomes for a closed city: 
 
Proposition 1  (Exogenous entrepreneurs in a closed city):  If the population of the city is 
fixed: 
(A)  An increase in the number of entrepreneurs will increase wages and worker 
utility,  decrease the number of workers per firm, and will have an ambiguous 
effect on land values. 
(B)  An increase in the share of entrepreneurs who produce traded goods will 
increase wages, worker utility, and land prices, and have no impact on the number 
of workers per firm. 
11 
  
Proof:  See Appendix. 
 
Most of the results in Proposition 1 are intuitive.  A larger number of 
entrepreneurs increase wages and the welfare of workers.  An increase in the share of 
entrepreneurs who sell on the global market has similar effects.  Places with plenty of 
entrepreneurs have a smaller average firm size.  The ambiguous connection between the 
number of entrepreneurs and land values is somewhat surprising.  It reflects the fact that 
an increase in the number of entrepreneurs can cause the profitability of firms to decline 
if the fixed costs involved in each entrepreneurial activity are sufficiently high.   
The primary limitation of Proposition 1 is that it takes the population of the city as 
fixed.  The hallmark of urban economics is that population levels respond to changes in 
parameters.  We now, therefore, adopt a specification where, in spatial equilibrium, the 
welfare of manufacturing workers in the city must equal a reservation utility level, and 
population adjusts accordingly.  If the other parameters in this model are fixed, then 
worker utility declines with the population level because of competition for land.    
In this case, it follows that: 
 
Proposition 2 (Exogenous entrepreneurs in an open city):  In an open city: 
(A)  An increase in the number of entrepreneurs will increase city population and 
land values and have an ambiguous effect on wages, the number of workers per 
firm, and profits of non-traded good entrepreneurs. 
(B)  An increase in the share of entrepreneurs who produce traded goods will 
increase wages, city population, land prices and the number of workers per firm 
and will have an ambiguous effect on profits of non-traded good entrepreneurs. 
 
Proof:  See Appendix. 
 
In this case, more entrepreneurship and more traded good entrepreneurship make 
the city larger and land in the city more expensive.  Entrepreneurship may not, however, 
increase wages, since entrepreneurs are making the city more attractive by creating a 
12 
 wider range of goods that can be bought there.
8  While it is always true that an increase in 
the share of entrepreneurship in traded goods increases firm size, the impact of 
entrepreneurship on firm size in this case is ambiguous.   It is possible that more 
entrepreneurship will attract so many new workers that the number of workers per firm 
will actually increase.    
The most interesting results connect the level of entrepreneurship with the return 
to entrepreneurship.  Proposition 2 illustrates that increases in the level of local 
entrepreneurship have an ambiguous effect the returns to entrepreneurship.  This suggests 
the possibility for a virtuous circle where the presence of entrepreneurs increases the 
returns for others to be entrepreneurial.  The economics behind this ambiguity are 
straightforward:  more entrepreneurs mean higher wages, which increases costs, but more 
entrepreneurship also means a larger market which increases the benefits to 
entrepreneurship.  Limited land ensures that wages will rise with entrepreneurship, which 
helps drive wages up and pushes the returns to entrepreneurship down.  If   is 
sufficiently high, then the land sector is less important, and entrepreneurship is more 
likely to lead to a virtuous circle where more entrepreneurs increase the returns to 
entrepreneurship. 
The main limitation of Proposition 2 -- which applies as well to Proposition 1 -- is 
that we have treated the supply of entrepreneurs as being exogenous.  Given the well-
documented variation in entrepreneurial activity across locations, we now relax this 
assumption and extend the model to consider an endogenous supply of entrepreneurs.  So 
far we have asked about the implications of entrepreneurship for urban success.  We now 
turn to the causes of entrepreneurship.   The model will show that a range of 
circumstances can potentially be related to local entrepreneurial activity.  These include:  
density, skills, a tradition of entrepreneurship, human capital, and physical capital 
 
Endogenous entrepreneurs 
So far, we have treated entrepreneurs as a fixed factor of production that 
determines the success of the city.   Yet a serious treatment of entrepreneurship in urban 
                                                 
8 Entrepreneurs are acting as amenities in this setup.  For recent work on amenities, see Rappaport (2007), 
Berger, Blomquist, and Peter (2008), Chen and Rosenthal (2008). 
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 locations must endogenize the supply of entrepreneurs.  The simplest way of 
endogenizing entrepreneurship is to assume that a city has an upward-sloping supply 
curve of entrepreneurs, defined by a distribution function so that the share of people 
whose costs of entrepreneurship are less than X is denoted F(X).   As such, the number of 
entrepreneurs is defined as F(π), where π denotes the expected profits from becoming an 
entrepreneur.
9  To simplify matters, we assume that entrepreneurs do not know whether 
their product will serve only a local market or will become a traded good when they are 
choosing whether or not to become active as entrepreneurs,.   As such expected profits 
equals   times the profits made by traded goods entrepreneurs plus  1      times the 
profits made by non-traded goods entrepreneurs.
10    
The previous section raised the possibility that entrepreneurial profits could be 
increasing with the number of entrepreneurs.   If that is the case, then it is at least possible 
that there are multiple equilibria in entrepreneurship.  In one equilibrium, the number of 
entrepreneurs is high and so are the returns to entrepreneurship.  In the other equilibrium, 
the number of entrepreneurs is low and so are the returns to entrepreneurship.  While we 
do not wish to rule out the possibility of a global change between these two sorts of 
equilibrium, in this section we will consider local comparative statics on the number of 
entrepreneurs taken a und a stable equilibria, which is defined so that  ro
  
 
               .    (3) 
Equation (3) essentially means that an increase in entrepreneurship will not have a 
destabilizing increase in the profits for each entrepreneur.    
With this assumption, the following proposition holds: 
 
Proposition 3 (Endogenous entrepreneurship):    
                                                 
9 This approach has obvious similarities to Lucas (1978).  It is worth pointing out that it implicitly assumes 
that entrepreneurs are risk neutral.  In contrast, Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) build a supply curve of 
entrepreneurs from differential risk tolerances of economic agents.   
10 An alternate approach to endogenizing entrepreneurial activity in a given city is to adopt the Forslid-
Ottaviano (2002) "footloose entrepreneurs" model.  In our approach, we have assumed immobile 
entrepreneurs, an assumption that seems consistent with empirical work on entrepreneurship by Sorenson 
and Audia (2000), Klepper (2007), Dahl and Sorenson (this issue) and others.   
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 (A)  In a closed city, the level of entrepreneurship is increasing with city 
population and decreasing with fixed cost (α) and has an ambiguous relationship 
with the share of traded goods and demand (Q).   
(B)  In an open city, the level of entrepreneurship is increasing with demand (Q) 
and land area (  ), is decreasing with fixed cost (α), and has an ambiguous 
relationship with the share of traded-goods producers.     
 
Proof:  See Appendix.   
 
Many of these results are intuitive.  Smaller fixed costs of starting a business 
always lead the level of entrepreneurship to rise.
11   Higher fixed costs both reduce 
profits directly and increase the wage.   An increase in city population reduces wage and 
increases demand, both of which make entrepreneurship more attractive.  In the open city 
model, an increase in available land,  , causes the population to rise which then indirectly 
increases the amount of labor.    
The least intuitive results concern the parameters   and Q.  The first of these 
parameters makes it more likely that the entrepreneur will produce a high-value traded 
good; the second parameter increases the returns to producing such a traded good.  
Intuitively, it would seem that either variable should increase the returns to 
entrepreneurship and the number of entrepreneurs.   That is exactly what happens in the 
case of the open city when Q rises.  However, for Q in the closed city case, and for the 
variable   in either case, the results are ambiguous.  These variables cause wages to rise 
and it is possible that higher values of Q or   can actually drive entrepreneurship down 
by pushing wages up so much.  While this does not seem likely, these results capture 
perhaps the flavor of Detroit after World War II, when the success of the automobile 
industry may have crowded out other entrepreneurial activities.    
How do these results relate to the core theories about the heterogeneity of 
entrepreneurship across space?  The variable   can be interpreted as reflecting the inputs 
                                                 
11 It is worth observing that the population is mobile, but entrepreneurs are not.  Changes in the equilibrium 
amount of entrepreneurship come from the activation of local entrepreneurs.  This seems to us to be 
consistent with the evidence of entrepreneurial stickiness in Michelacci and Silva (2007) and in Klepper 
(this issue). 
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 needed for entrepreneurship.  If those inputs are abundant, perhaps because of large 
numbers of input suppliers or venture capitalists, then entrepreneurship will be more 
common.   The variables N and   connect entrepreneurship to the size of the market.  In 
bigger areas, there will be more entrepreneurs, but in this model there is no assurance that 
the level of entrepreneurship will rise by more than one-to-one.  This could be assured by 
assuming a sufficiently elastic supply of entrepreneurs.   The variables of Q or   reflect 
exogenous factors in the place that increase the potential returns to entrepreneurship.  
Historically, perhaps, New York’s port might have been seen as causing an increase in 
the value of Q.    
This framework illustrates the impact on entrepreneurship of market size, returns 
to entrepreneurship and input costs.  It also illustrates the impact of entrepreneurship on 
local economic performance.  A virtuous circle arises through market size.  One could 
similarly add entrepreneurs to models that emphasize inputs, skills, or ideas to obtain a 
parallel sort of circularity (see, for instance, Strange et al, 2006).   
The framework does not address the Chinitz (1961) intuition that the supply of 
entrepreneurs might be different across space.  To capture this possibility, we can simply 
assume that the number of entrepreneurs equals         , where   shifts the supply 
schedule across space.   This would capture the possibility that some places just have 
more entrepreneurial people.   Alternatively, urban density might act as a multiplier so 
that the supply becomes      , where   1 , because each entrepreneur spreads ideas to 
others.  Unsurprisingly, then it follows that the level of entrepreneurship is rising with 
either   or    (so long as       1   .   While all of our other comparative statics caused 
the level of entrepreneurship to increase by increasing the net returns to entrepreneurship, 
an increase in these variables will cause the net returns to entrepreneurship to fall, at least 
if the conditions needed for the returns to entrepreneurship to be declining in the level of 
entrepreneurship hold.  However, it is possible, since the returns to entrepreneurship can 
actually increase with the number of entrepreneurs, that this increase in supply may 
actually be associated with an increase in the returns to entrepreneurship.    
 
IV.    The Causes and Consequences of Entrepreneurship 
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 We now turn to the papers in this issue and the literatures from which they 
emerge.  The section will largely be devoted to discussing how both this body of research 
fits with the causes and consequences of entrepreneurship framework laid out in this 
paper.  
 
The Impact of Entrepreneurship 
Both in this issue and more widely, there has been relatively little literature on the 
broad impacts on entrepreneurship on urban economies.
12  We suspect that this reflects 
two problems.  First, the vast majority of entrepreneurship researchers, and indeed 
probably most of the academic community, rarely question the positive benefits of 
entrepreneurship for the local community.  After all, real world examples abound of 
entrepreneurs who have helped their cities economically.   Second, the ability to find a 
causal link between entrepreneurship and urban success would require exogenous 
variables that increase entrepreneurship but have no other impact on the local economy.  
As Section III's model illustrates, most of the candidate variables that explain 
entrepreneurship, such as market size, could easily have a direct impact on city growth.   
The piece of evidence that is most suggestive of the positive benefits of 
entrepreneurship on city growth is the strong connection between small average firm size 
and subsequent growth (see Glaeser et al., 1992; Rosenthal and Strange, 2003 and 2009; 
and Glaeser et al, this issue).  This correlation is certainly suggestive.  Small firms are 
likely to be newer and more entrepreneurial, but after all, this correlation has many 
interpretations.  Small average firm sizes also means more competitive labor markets, or 
perhaps fewer regulatory barriers to growth.
13,14     
Audretsch and Keilbach (2004) have used an alternative measure of 
entrepreneurship—the rate of new start-ups.  This variable is strongly correlated with the 
economic output of West German Counties.  The start-up rate in the high tech sector is 
particularly associated with success.  Just as in the case of the firm size results, these 
                                                 
12 There has been a larger body of work on entrepreneurship and economic success at the country level, as 
in Audretsch and Thurik (2001) and Audretsch et al (2006).  
13 The self-employment rate also, far  more weakly, predicts urban employment growth (Glaeser, 2007).   
14 The result that Wal-Mart has negative impacts on the local economy (Neumark et al, 2008)) can be seen 
as complementary to the small firm effect.  See Haltiwanger et al (this issue) for an analysis of big box 
firms more generally.  See Basker (2005) for evidence that Wal-Mart's effects are not necessarily negative. 
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 correlations cannot be conclusively interpreted as causal results showing the benefits of 
entrepreneurship, since start-up rates are unlikely to be exogenous.  
As discussed above, another aspect of entrepreneurship is the independence of 
entrepreneurs.  Rosenthal and Strange (2003) consider this directly by distinguishing 
between firms that are subsidiaries of another corporate entity from those that are not.  
No consistent relationship is found between the presence of non-subsidiary firms and 
growth.  This preliminary evidence suggests that in thinking about the impacts of 
entrepreneurship, the ownership dimension might not be as important as the size 
dimension. 
Economists have thought, at least since Solow (1956), that technological 
innovation is associated with growth.  At the local level, Porter (1990) has argued that the 
innovativeness of certain clusters accounts for their growth.  Moreover, the history of 
technological innovations, such as the assembly line and software, suggest a significant 
role for entrepreneurs, such as Henry Ford and Bill Gates.  Yet  there is surprisingly little 
formal econometric work at the city level that has quantified the relationship between 
local innovation and other outcomes.  This is presumably explained by the two points 
raised above:  no one doubts such a relationship, and identification is difficult to achieve.     
Kolko and Neumark (this issue) present an alternative means of assessing the 
benefits of different forms of entrepreneurship.  Instead of looking at economic growth or 
level of output, they focus on the behavior of firms in response to shocks.  Many local 
leaders would like firms that keep employment steady even during a downturn, and in 
principle, local entrepreneurship could provide a cushion against recession.  Indeed, 
many communities have specifically tried to protect locally owned businesses from 
externally owned competitors (such as Big Box retailers) with the idea that locally owned 
businesses are more likely to provide stable employment for local workers.   
Kolko and Neumark find mixed evidence for this claim.  Company headquarters 
are more stable than other establishments.  Locally owned single establishment firms are 
actually more sensitive to downward industry shocks, but less sensitive to downward 
regional shocks.   Likewise, among smaller firms there is some tendency of local 
ownership to mute the response to regional shocks.  However, among larger firms, local 
ownership has no impact in the response to shocks.    
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The Sources of Entrepreneurship 
There has been more research that bears on the sources of entrepreneurship than 
on its impact.  The line of research in urban economics that has the most to say regarding 
the sources of entrepreneurship is the literature on agglomeration.  As noted above, this 
literature has identified inputs, skills, and ideas as being involved in the process 
generating agglomeration economies.
15  The literature has also looked at political and 
cultural forces and also natural advantage as explanations for agglomeration. 
Many themes in this literature relate to entrepreneurship.  Fallick et al (2006) and 
Freedman (2008) consider the relationship between agglomeration and job hopping.  
They show that mobility increases with industrial concentration.  This relates to both the 
self-employment and change dimensions of entrepreneurship.  Holmes (1999) shows a 
relationship between vertical integration and agglomeration in the U.S.  Li and Lu (2009) 
show a similar relationship in China.  A large literature has shown a relationship between 
agglomeration and innovation.  Recent contributions include Agrawal et al (2008), 
Gerlach et al (2009), and Simonen and McCann (2008).     
In this issue, most of the papers deal with the factors that explain why 
entrepreneurship might differ across space.  One of these factors is differences in the 
returns to entrepreneurship.  The only paper in this volume that directly addresses returns 
to entrepreneurship is  Glaeser et al (this issue).  This paper specifically looks at whether 
the value of shipments per employee, a proxy for the returns to entrepreneurship, are 
higher in places with abundant small firms where there are lots of entrepreneurs.  No 
correlation is found.  This suggests that these clusters of entrepreneurship are not being 
created by the presence of unusually high returns to entrepreneurial activity.   This clearly 
calls for looking at supply shifters.   
Chinitz’s (1961) seminal work on entrepreneurship emphasized the importance of 
inputs to entrepreneurship, which seemed to be far more prevalent in New York than in 
Pittsburgh.  He argued that a competitive economy, made up of small independent firms, 
would make it much easier for entrepreneurs to find independent suppliers.  Certainly, no 
input is more important for new entrepreneurs than finance itself, so the availability of 
                                                 
15 See the recent literature reviews in Duranton-Puga (2004) and Rosenthal-Strange (2004).   
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 venture capital should surely be one of those variables that could impact the rate of 
entrepreneurship.   
Chen et al (this issue) look specifically at the geography of the venture capital 
industry.  They find that this industry is overwhelmingly located in three cities:  New 
York, San Francisco and Boston.  This might seem to give a great advantage to 
entrepreneurs working in those locations.  However, they also find that these firms 
frequently invest outside of their cities and actually earn higher returns from spatially 
distant investments.  This may, of course, reflect a selection process.  If it were more 
expensive to invest in distant projects, venture capitalists would tend to invest in only the 
most promising of such projects, and this would elevate the return on investments outside 
of the firms’ immediate locations, on average.  In any case, venture capitalists seem to be 
capable of making wise investments away from their home towns, which suggests that 
the availability of capital might not be as geographically concentrated as the venture 
capitalists.  
However, these findings still continue to suggest that the agglomerations of 
venture capitalists help create agglomerations of entrepreneurs.  If investors only bother 
to invest far away if they can get higher returns by doing so, then firms in Silicon Valley 
can obtain venture capital for worse projects than firms in Idaho, and the Silicon Valley 
firms consequently enjoy an advantage.  Somewhat paradoxically, the presence of high 
returns elsewhere actually supports the idea that entrepreneurs enjoy an advantage from 
being close to the clusters of venture capital.   
The paper by Agrawal et al (this issue) takes a different angle in examining the 
geography of innovation by looking at the advantage of competition vs. monopoly.  Just 
as large vertically integrated firms might not sell goods to new start-ups, such large firms 
might not provide as many intellectual spillovers if they are more closed to outsiders.   
This paper looks at the patenting activity of firms in “company towns” that are dominated 
by a single large enterprise and compares that activity with innovation in more 
competitive environments.   
The main conclusion of Agrawal et al is that the dominant firms in company 
towns are, indeed, more inward looking.  They are more likely to cite their own patents 
than comparable firms elsewhere.   Yet these large companies do not seem to reduce the 
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 tendency of their smaller neighbors to cite broadly.   Moreover, the patents invented in 
these company towns have just as much impact as patents invented elsewhere.   These 
findings could be interpreted as evidence that the creative myopia associated with the 
presence of large firms in company towns does not necessarily deter productivity and 
innovation.   
The paper by Glaeser et al (this issue) also looks at the connection between local 
industrial structure and employment growth.  They find that an abundance of small firms 
strongly predicts new establishment births.   As noted above, this relationship does not 
appear to stem from an effect of nearby small firms on the returns to entrepreneurship.  
Rather, the relationship depends on the supply of entrepreneurs.   
A different perspective on the interaction between large and small firms is 
provided by Haltiwanger et al (this issue).  They examine the degree to which big-box 
stores – both retailers and restaurants – displace employment at local smaller, mom and 
pop stores.  They find that the presence of big box stores adversely affects employment at 
smaller firms, primarily by causing smaller firms to exit.  Importantly, this effect is 
concentrated among small firms that are in the same industry as the big-box competitor.  
In addition, this effect attenuates sharply with distance, and is much less pronounced just 
a few miles away.  The very local geographic nature of the effects of competition from 
big box retailers parallels previous research showing that the spillover effects of nearby 
agglomerations of employment attenuate rapidly with distance  (e.g. Rosenthal and 
Strange (2003, 2008), Andersson et al (2009)). 
Entrepreneurs are often educated, so an increase in the share of educated workers 
can be seen as an increase in the supply of entrepreneurs.  An abundance of educated 
workers may also increase the returns to entrepreneurship by providing skilled labor, a 
necessary input into many firms.  The paper by Doms et al (this issue) examines the 
connection between the education level of workers themselves and of the workers' 
communities and entrepreneurship.  It draws on several different surveys, each with its 
strengths and weaknesses.  This includes a new and unique panel of several thousand 
newly established small businesses that are followed for four years (the Kauffman Firm 
Survey, or KFS).  The paper also utilizes individual-level cross-section data from the 
voluminous 5 percent Public Use Micro Sample of the 2000 decennial census. 
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 Based on these and other sources, Doms, Lewis and Robb (this issue) first 
document a strong positive correlation between the average level of education in a 
metropolitan area and the level of education among the area’s community of business 
owners and self-employed.  This is not surprising, but reinforces the importance of 
distinguishing between the influence of individual versus metropolitan-wide levels of 
education.  Indeed, the paper further shows that while entrepreneurial activity and 
business turnover, as measured by new business formation and deaths, is more prevalent 
in educated cities, the relationship appears to be most closely associated with individual 
rather than city-wide levels of education.  Based on the census data, more highly 
educated individuals are more likely to be self-employed, and conditional on individual 
education, there is no additional positive association between self-employment and 
metropolitan area college share. 
Are these relationships between education and the propensity for entrepreneurship 
mirrored in the returns to entrepreneurship?  Doms, Lewis, and Robb (this issue) provide 
evidence on this point as well.  Specifically, in both the KFS and census surveys, they 
find that entrepreneurs with more education enjoy improved business outcomes, and that 
this relationship is highly non-linear: there is a strong positive premium for having a 
college degree.  However, conditional on the individual’s own level of education, the 
association between local area education and business outcomes is less clear.  In the KFS, 
this latter relationship is positive, but not distinguishable from zero.  In the census data, a 
clear positive relationship emerges: self-employed individual earn more when operating 
in more highly educated locations, even after controlling for an extensive array of 
industry-metro area fixed effects, the individual’s own level of education, and many other 
individual-level controls.  Moreover, from both data sources, and especially from the 
census, there is suggestive evidence that it is primarily high-skilled sectors that benefit 
from the presence of nearby college educated workers.  These findings complement 
Glaeser et al (this issue) who show that labor-intensive firms are particularly more likely 
to form in high human capital areas.  They are also related to Bacolod et al (2009) who 
find that the returns to skills rise with city size.  More generally, these findings confirm 
that education plays  a crucial but complicated role in contributing to a successful 
entrepreneurial environment. 
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 Since the location of skilled workers and technical expertise seems to be so 
important, it is natural to focus on the mobility of technical workers and innovative 
activity.  Kerr (this issue) and Dahl and Sorenson (this issue) each shed light here.  Kerr 
examines the speed with which innovative activity migrates across cities in the United 
States.  He demonstrates that development of breakthrough technologies tends to be 
followed by subsequent intensive research and development that refines the initial 
innovation.  This process attracts additional scientists and engineers to the location where 
the breakthrough occurs, and contributes to movement of innovative activity across cities.  
The speed with which such adjustments occur depends in part on the mobility of 
technical workers.  Kerr demonstrates this by focusing on immigrant scientists and 
engineers, a group thought to be particularly mobile and footloose.  Evidence confirms 
that industries reliant on immigrant technical workers exhibit faster migration of 
innovative activity towards locations where breakthroughs occur. 
Kerr’s (this issue) work highlights both the dynamics of breakthroughs, as well as 
the impact of worker mobility on the speed with which innovative activity and technical 
ability spreads across cities.  This relates to prior work on the dynamics of industry 
migration of across cities.  Duranton (2007) and Findeisen and Sudekum (2008) show 
that the size distribution of cities in a given country tends not to change much over time, 
and that the relative size of individual cities changes only very slowly.  However, the 
industrial composition of employment within individual cities changes at a comparatively 
rapid pace as industries migrate across locations.  Kerr’s results highlight factors that 
contribute to such migration. 
The paper by Dahl and Sorenson (this issue) also considers the mobility of 
scientific and technical workers, in this case in Denmark.  A key finding is that scientific 
and technical workers in Denmark are heavily drawn to locations close to family and 
friends.  While economic incentives matter – and especially for older workers – Dahl and 
Sorenson provide compelling evidence that Danish scientists and technical workers are 
willing to trade off substantial income for the opportunity to locate closer to their parents, 
high school friends, and other important social contacts.  Such ties tend to create 
geographic frictions within high-skilled labor markets, and may serve to slow the rate at 
which innovative activity would migrate across cities.  In many respects, these findings 
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 complement the evidence offered by Kerr (this issue) in which mobile workers accelerate 
the migration of innovative activity.  
The causes of entrepreneurship considered thus far do not come close to forming 
an exhaustive list.  There are many additional factors, many relating to government 
policies, especially regulations that increase the costs of entrepreneurship.   Becker and 
Henderson (2000) and List et al (2003) both show that air quality regulations reduce firm 
birth in the relevant industries.  Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) show that French zoning 
regulation reduces new firm entry in the retail sector.  On the other hand, inaction in the 
face of urban problems such as congestion seems to be negatively associated with growth 
(Hymel, 2009).     
Rosenthal and Ross (this issue) consider a different urban problem, the local rate 
of violent crime.  Pope (2008) and Linden and Rockoff (2008) show that the fear of crime 
can have a large impact on housing prices.  Rosenthal and Ross consider the relationship 
of crime to entrepreneurship.  The paper deals with the sorting of sectors of the economy 
into  high- and low-crime neighborhoods depending on a sector’s relative sensitivity to 
crime.  The paper illustrates this by comparing retail industries to wholesale sectors and 
high-end restaurants to low-end eateries.  Because retail industries rely on pedestrian 
shoppers, they will be especially sensitive to violent crime.  Because high-end restaurants 
do a disproportionate amount of their business in the evening, they should be especially 
sensitive to violent crime over the prime dinner hours.  Using data for five U.S. cities, 
Rosenthal and Ross obtain evidence consistent with these priors:  higher levels of violent 
crime reduce the share of retail trade in an area relative to wholesale trade, and higher 
local rates of violent crime during peak dining hours reduce the presence of high-end 
restaurants relative to lower-tier eateries. 
Many of the papers in this issue have dealt with the supply of entrepreneurs.  Of 
course, the local supply of entrepreneurs only matters if entrepreneurs are tied to a local 
area.  Klepper (this issue) offers a further perspective on this topic by examining the 
history of spinoffs in Detroit – with the auto industry – and in Silicon Valley – with the 
integrated circuit or semi-conductor industry.  Remarkably, the paper draws upon data for 
the entire history and lineage of modern day auto makers and producers of integrated 
circuits. 
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 Klepper documents that early in the auto industry’s history, several locations were 
thriving centers of production, as was also the case for integrated circuits.  However, 
spinoffs from unusually successful founding (parent) companies were themselves more 
likely to be unusually successful, and these spinoffs tended to locate close to their parent 
firms.   Klepper argues that this tendency for overachieving parent companies to spawn 
nearby overachieving spinoffs accounts for the eventual dominance of Detroit in the auto 
industry, and the corresponding dominance of Silicon Valley for integrated circuits.  The 
evidence presented by Klepper is compelling and speaks directly to the important role 
that unusually talented and innovative entrepreneurs may have on an industry, and the 
role of spinoffs in fostering agglomerations of both innovation and industrial activity. 
It is less clear why these spinoffs remained in such close proximity to their parent 
companies.  Was it because of the desire to remain close to family and friends, as in Dahl 
and Sorenson (this issue)?  Was there or some other aspect of the technical labor force 
that might have deterred migration (which would contrast to the role of immigrant 
workers as in Kerr, this issue)?  Or perhaps it was the traditional role of agglomerative 
spillovers in the form of input sharing, labor pooling, and the opportunity to learn from 
one’s neighbors, as emphasized in the agglomeration literature.  These are issues that 
bear further study, but which do not change the important implication of Klepper (this 
issue) that any assessment of the impact of entrepreneurship on local urban economies 
must take seriously the role of spinoffs and “organizational reproduction.” 
 
V.  Conclusion: directions for future research 
 
We believe that the essays in this issue contribute to our understanding of the 
major questions about entrepreneurship and economic geography.  Yet economic 
research is still just beginning to understand the key topics laid out in this paper.  Our 
ability to model and estimate the creative sparks of Henry Ford and Alfred Sloan remains 
limited.  In conclusion, we will lay out some of the most important open questions.  We 
hope that this may guide future research in this area. 
First, and perhaps most importantly, what is the impact of entrepreneurship at the 
local level?  We still lack compelling evidence on the impact of entrepreneurship on 
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 cities and regions.  The biggest handicap to work in this area is the absence of exogenous 
variation in entrepreneurship that is independent of other sources of economic success.  
Both basic research and public policy have a great need for definitive work in this area.    
Second, what are the causes of spatial variations in entrepreneurial activity?  
While there has been much more written about the causes of entrepreneurship than about 
its effects, there are still many unanswered questions.  To what extent are differences in 
entrepreneurship results of differences in entrepreneurial returns?  There is evidence that 
entrepreneurship  increases with the availability of relevant inputs, but we do not know 
which inputs are most important.  For many specific inputs, we still lack well identified 
estimates of the impact of input availability on entrepreneurship.  We know more about 
how skills and entrepreneurial types impact entrepreneurship.  Still, there are many 
unanswered questions in this area as well. To what extent do social interactions in a place 
create a local multiplier in entrepreneurship?   To what extent does events early in an 
individual’s career influence the propensity to become an entrepreneur?  Finally, how do 
government policies and culture impact entrepreneurial activity.  Overall, although we 
know that the supply curve of entrepreneurs slopes up, we do not understand in a general 
way the slope of the entrepreneurial supply curve or how it differs across metropolitan 
areas.  This remains a crucial area for future research.  
Third, whether one considers the local causes of entrepreneurship or the local 
effects, it is unclear at what geographic scale the spatial mechanics of entrepreneurship 
operate.  The papers in this issue have all considered the local dimensions of 
entrepreneurship.  In most cases, the spatial issues operate at the city level.  In this spirit, 
several papers consider the city-level conditions that lead to the creation of self-
reinforcing entrepreneurial clusters.  In other cases, the spatial issues operate at larger 
(regional) or smaller (neighborhood) levels of geography.  The research question that is 
suggested by these differences in approaches is clear:  at what spatial scale do these 
entrepreneurs operate?  Are the effects highly local, or do they impact entire regions?       
Fourth, although the papers in this issue have largely focused on business creation 
and economic growth, it is almost certainly true that entrepreneurship has much broader 
impacts.  Which suggests the fourth question:  how does entrepreneurial activity impact 




at the edges of most cities in recent years.  This suggests a link between entrepreneurial 
patterns and spatial decentralization and sprawl.  Similarly, some areas within cities have 
robust business sectors.  Some areas do not.  How do the factors determining 
entrepreneurship impact spatial patterns of inequality and ghettoes?  Finally, the 
competition among local governments discussed by Tiebout (1956) is itself a sort of 
entrepreneurship.  How does fiscal entrepreneurship impact cities?  Such 
entrepreneurship has the potential to be particularly important in developing countries 
(Lichtenberg and Ding, 2009).  There are fine examples of research on all these 
questions, but definitive answers have eluded us. 
These four large open questions quite naturally suggest a fifth: what are 
appropriate policies towards spatial entrepreneurship?  Clearly, with only tentative 
answers to the first four questions, it is difficult to argue for a comprehensive and 
intrusive program.  But given the current evidence that entrepreneurship matters and that 
there are a range of factors that impact entrepreneurial activity, it would be a grave 
mistake to simply ignore entrepreneurship.   
Entrepreneurship is rooted in a place, even in the industries that are most 
technologically advanced.  Few people would doubt that Silicon Valley or New York or 
Bangalore have special characteristics that help make them centers for entrepreneurship 
in different sectors.  Few people would also doubt that entrepreneurs have often played a 
major role in forging local economies.  For these reasons, the returns are high to bringing 
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 Appendix:  Proofs. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
If there are N workers in the city each of whom earns a wage of W, and if total 
r l pro its  equal       ,  then the price of land will equal   entrepreneu ia f
   
                .   The assumption of iso-elastic demand ensures that prices will equal 
 
     , where    denotes the wage.  Total labor earnings plus entrepreneurial profits in 
the city will equal 
         
    ,  so the price of land is 
   
    times this amount.   Total wealth 
including renter income in city equals 
         
       .    If   0 , total welfare for a 
manufacturing worker in t ua  the ci y eq ls: 
   
                         
 
                   
   
 (A1) 
If   0 ,   the city is a closed economy, wages can be normalized to one, and worker 
welfare equals 
   
   
         
 
                 
   
.    (A2) 
Total consumption of each non-traded or non-traded good in the city equals 
   
  
     
          
, where Y denotes the wealth of the relevant individual.  The total 
consumption of each good in the city is 
 
 
           
          
 and consumption of all 
domestically produced goods in the city equals 
 
 
             
          
.  Demand for each traded 
good outside the city is     , so total exports in this sector equals        .   Total 
labor de d man  equals 
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Setting th  to l o es is equal ab r supply giv  
  
          
       =                 . (A4) 
  t ach non-traded goods entrepreneur equals  The  otal profits of e
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and the total profits of each traded good entrepreneur equal 
34 
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From (A4), we have: 
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Differentiating (A7) with respect to   s    yield
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Using the notation   
   
        
 , (A8) can be rewritten 
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Differentiating the equation with respect to  elds    yi
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     0.    (A 0)  1
The numbers of workers per firm equals 
 
  
 which is obviously declining with    
when N n f o  is fixed and indepe dent o   .   W rker welfare equals 
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Substituting in 
             
       =             ,    (A12) 
we obtain  
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The derivative of the logarith A 3) w th e ect to    yields  m of ( 1 i  r sp
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 ,  (A14) 
which is positive if 
  2        1    2    1 
   
                   
        
     
 0  (A15)   
The inequality (A15) always holds.   
  The derivative of the logarithm of (A13) with respect to   yields: 
  
       




    
 
   
 
  ,  (A16) 
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 which i f   s positive if and only i
                       
                     1 . (A17) 
(A17) always holds. 
The cost of land equals:  
         
     
   
    .  It is increasing in   since wages are 




     
          
       
          
 
        
 ,  
which is positive if and only if         .    
(A18) 
 
 Proof of Proposition 2:   
The spatial equilibrium requires that worker welfare equals the constant 
reservation utility.  This implies that               
 
                    or 
                             . 
  
     are constant with respect to changes in the 
parameters    and  .     
  Standard notions of stability require that welfare be declining with N (taking into 
account the impact that N has on wages). Differentiating the labor  equilibrium equation 
with res c o N yields:   pe t t
  
    
    
                              =
                 
                                 0  
 (A19) 
Since w a g    pulation it is sufficient to ascertain that   ages are alw ys declinin with po
                    . 
  
        (A20) 
is alway i i ogarithm of (A20) yields:  s declining w th W.  D fferentiating the l
          
 
    
  
     1  
          
          
.    (A21) 
For this l  quantity to be a ways positive, it must be that  
                1      
      
          
 0 . (A22) 
Rearran o ging and simplifying, the condition bec mes 
                 2    1  1             0 ,   (A23) 
which must hold.    
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The denominator is positive.  The numerator,  2 1      1                
 1        1    , is obviously positive as long as 2 1      1      .  If   is 
sufficiently close to one, it will be negative.   Note that if   1 , then            
   . 
 
   
(A25) 
 must be constant with respect to changes in    which ensures that wages will 
fall as entrepreneurship rises.   
Differentiating the logarithm of (A23) with respect to   yields:   
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   The cost of land equals a constant times           , yet we know that 
              
 
   
(A27) 
                is constant.  This implies that            
    
 
                  will be constant, and that           will rise if and only 
if 
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rises.   Th va v  th   ari h es o ith respect to   yields:  e deri ti e of e log thm of t is expr si n w
 
 
    
     
          
 
  
    =  
               





   ,  (A29) 
which is always positive, so land values a l r  wi      re a ways  ising th  .
T e der ve o r            
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(A31) ca n n be rewritte  as 
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which is always positive.   
To find the effect of   on N, it is enough to note that               
 
    
            st b  c tant, so N will rise if          mu   e ons
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rises.  The derivative of the logarithm of this expression with respect to   is  
   
 
   
     
          
 
  
     (A34) 
which is always positive.   
To find the effect on N of   , we first note that           is rising with   , so 
if increases in    lower W, it must be that N rises.  As such we need only concern 
ourselves with the cases where increases in    increase W.  Next differentiating 
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which must be positive if 
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which is positive if and only if   1     0 .  If   1     0 , then 
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If     1     0 , then          
  
  
    is decreasing with    and  
     
  
 
      
    is 
decreasing with 
     
  
, so as    rises 
     
  
 must fall.  However, if     1     0  it is 
possible that          
  
  
    may still be decreasing with    if     1   1        
 1        2    1       , which would hold, for example for high enough levels 
of  .  In which case, the comparative static would be reversed.    
Finally, we turn to the profitability of the non-traded good entrepreneurs which 
equals 
           
        
    .   The d tive of
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If   0 h r y i , t is exp ession is positive if and onl f  
2                  1   1          1    2    1        (A40) 
which will always hold if   is sufficiently close to one.   Conversely if   is distinctly 
below one, then a large enough value of   ensures that the inequality will fail.    
  T   i e f r reneur profit with respect to   is  he derivat v  o  non-t aded entrep
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which eq l ua s:   
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This expression will be positive if   is small and  1                       
1  1      , which will always hold if   is sufficiently close to one.  However, for 




Proof of Proposition 3:   
The expected profit of each non-traded goods entrepreneur equals 
           
        
 
   
       l r       , so the equi ib ium is that 
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For any u a   ,  exogeno s v riable, Z  we can write:   
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and tota f te th qu n t pect    g      lly di ferentia e  a ti y with res  to Z to et:  
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where we mean 
 
   
           
        
  
 
               to signify the derivative of the 
expression with respect to Z, not counting any indirect effects working through    or   .  
Grouping terms together, this yields that 
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represents the complete impact of    on profits and since we have assumed that 
 
       
      , we are assuming that   1               and so the denominator is positive.  As 
such the sign of the derivative is the same as the sign of the numerator, or the sign of the 
terms in parentheses since        0 , which we refer to as M. 
 
Case 1: Closed City 
In the closed city case, wages are determined by the equality 
40 
           
       =                 ,   (A48) 
so the variable N, impacts wages but nothing else in the equation.  Differentiating gives 
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so entrepreneurship is rising with c  size.    ity
We will also investigate  ,   and Q, and it helpful to note that in the closed city 
case:   
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 0 .   
In the case of  , it is easy to see that the value of M is negative, since the wage effect is 
positive and the direct effect on wages is also positive.   
In the case of   or Q, the value of M equals either 
     
        
  or 
     
        
 times  
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This can be rewritten as 
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If   is small and W<2 (which will occur if        +    2          2   
      
   
. then 
this will hold.  Alternatively, it will hold if    is close enough to one.  If    is sufficiently 
large, then wages will explode and all of the terms can be negative.   
 
Case 2: Open City 
In  he   city ase, wages are pinned down  y the spatial equili
              
  
   
t open  c b brium  
           
   
   
     
   
 
   




This means that 
  
    0 , so the number of entrepreneurs is again declining with  , and 
  
    0 , so the number of entrepreneurs is rising with Q.  Also: 
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As   approaches one, the value of M approaches 
                 
        
   which is 
unambiguously positive.   Conversely if   gets sufficiently high, then wages explode and 
all of the terms are negative.   
 
 
 